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Make Hay While the Sun Shines: 
Private Equity and the  
False Claims Act  
 
For years, the federal government has used the False Claims Act to 
police fraud in the healthcare industry. Every year, the Department of Justice 
recovers billions of dollars from healthcare companies for their False Claims 
Act violations, both penalizing wrongdoers and providing incentives for 
whistleblowers to come forward. Over the past decade, however, private equity 
activity within the healthcare industry has increased significantly, presenting 
questions as to how the False Claims Act applies when a private equity firm’s 
portfolio company is accused of wrongdoing. This Note analyzes the ambiguity 
in how different courts have previously applied the False Claims Act to different 
corporate forms—focusing on the level of involvement required of a parent 
organization—to determine how the Act should apply to private equity firms 
going forward, concluding that any direct involvement by a private equity firm 
in fraud committed by its portfolio company should trigger False Claims Act 
liability for the private equity firm.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2019, the Department of Justice announced a 
settlement had been reached in a False Claims Act lawsuit that shocked 
and captivated legal, healthcare, and financial insiders.1 The case—
United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC—marked the 
first time that a private equity (“PE”) firm was held liable for the alleged 
crimes of its investment portfolio company.2 The fraudulent scheme was 
alleged to “constitute the largest volume of cash kickbacks over a period 
of one year or less in the history of U.S. government health programs.”3 
The private equity firm, Riordan, Lewis & Haden (“RLH”), along with 
its portfolio company, Patient Care America (“PCA”), agreed to pay 
 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Compounding Pharmacy, Two of Its Executives, and 
Private Equity Firm Agree to Pay $21.36 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 
18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/compounding-pharmacy-two-its-executives-and-private-
equity-firm-agree-pay-2136-million [https://perma.cc/V73X-KQEX]; see, e.g., Christopher Hewitt & 
Jayne Juvan, Diabetic Care RX Case Is a Warning Sign for Private Equity, LAW360 (May 7, 2018, 
1:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1041067/diabetic-care-rx-case-is-a-warning-sign-for-
private-equity [https://perma.cc/9PCC-Z7ZG] (“The United States government recently sent shock 
waves through the private equity industry by charging a private equity firm for its portfolio 
company’s alleged health care fraud.”).  
 2. No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle, 2019 WL 1054125 (S.D. Fla. dismissed Oct. 1, 2019); see 
Brian Bewley & Kaitlyn Dunn, Government Files Amended FCA Complaint Against Private Equity 
Firm and Its Portfolio Company, JD SUPRA (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
government-files-amended-fca-complaint-69787/ [https://perma.cc/6VY9-8SBY] (“This 
case . . . represents the first time DOJ has intervened in an FCA suit against a private equity firm 
alongside a healthcare portfolio company accused of submitting false claims.”).  
 3. First Amended Federal Civ. False Claims Act Complaint & Request for Jury Trial at 2, 
Medrano, 2019 WL 1054125 (No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle) [hereinafter First Amended 
Complaint]. Note, however, that this allegation is absent from the Complaint in Intervention later 
filed by the United States. The United States’ Complaint in Intervention, Medrano, 2019 WL 
1054125 (No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle) [hereinafter Complaint in Intervention].  
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$21,050,000 to settle claims that they had used illegal kickbacks to 
induce referrals for costly, and medically unnecessary, pain creams in 
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute and False Claims Act.4  
The False Claims Act—the federal government’s biggest tool to 
police fraud in the healthcare industry—has routinely been invoked 
against parent corporations.5 Though naming a private equity firm as 
a defendant in a False Claims case was unprecedented, it was not 
entirely absurd: the notion of imposing False Claims Act liability on a 
semi-external third party that is able to exercise some degree of control 
or management over the subsidiary is nothing new. The unique 
structure of private equity ownership and oversight of investment 
companies, however, is not completely compatible with existing 
doctrines of corporate liability.  
Indeed, one can argue that imposing liability on this new class 
of defendants is squarely within the purpose of the False Claims Act, 
and extending the doctrine is simply effectuating congressional intent 
as applied to a landscape of evolving corporate and investment 
structures. Unfortunately for the legal analysts carefully tracking the 
Medrano case, however, a settlement was reached before the district 
judge had the opportunity to issue a final ruling.6 How well the 
government’s theories of liability against RLH would hold up under 
judicial scrutiny remains open to speculation—the Department of 
Justice’s decision to name RLH as a defendant, however, sends a clear 
signal that it now sees private equity firms as fair game in False Claims 
Act lawsuits.7 
In a healthcare space increasingly dominated by private equity 
actors, how these firms are regulated could have a profound impact on 
healthcare in America. Private equity activity in the healthcare 
industry has exploded within the past decade: in 2009, private equity 
 
 4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 1. 
 5. Scott Stein & Brenna Jenny, Court Rules Corporate Parent Not Liable for Subsidiary’s 
Alleged FCA Violations, SIDLEY: ORIGINAL SOURCE (Dec. 22, 2014), https://fcablog.sidley.com/ 
court-rules-corporate-parent-not-liable-for-subsidiarys-alleged-fca-violations/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W5W2-C2FE]. 
 6. Id.; see Lori Smith & Dana Petrillo, The Long Arm of the Law Lengthens: What the U.S. 
ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC Settlement Means for Private Equity Investors, WHITE 
& WILLIAMS LLP (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-What-the-
US-ex-rel-Medrano-Diabetic-Care-RX-LLC-Settlement-Means-for-Private-Equity-Investors.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7VP-8UGH] (“Because the claims were settled with no determination of 
liability, the precedential value of this case is limited.”). 
 7. See Nathan J. Andrisani, Eric W. Sitarchuk & Matthew D. Klayman, DOJ Targeting 
Private Equity Firms in False Claims Act Litigation, TEMP. 10-Q, https://www2.law.temple.edu/ 
10q/doj-targeting-private-equity-firms-in-false-claims-act-litigation/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4UZN-SCZJ] (“Based on its recent complaint in intervention . . . , DOJ may be 
setting its sights on a new class of potential defendants in FCA cases: private equity firms.”). 
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buyers and sellers were involved in 229 healthcare deals.8 That number 
hit 380 in 2020, despite a raging global pandemic.9 There has been 
considerable debate as to whether the influx of private equity activity 
in healthcare benefits or harms consumers. But Medrano provides one 
concrete manifestation of fears that have been simmering beneath the 
surface since the blowup of private equity activity in the healthcare 
sector—namely, fear that a hunger for profits would take precedence 
over medical necessity at the ultimate expense of quality of care under 
the rigidly defined short-term timeline PE firms prefer. The COVID-19 
pandemic has further thrust PE practices into the spotlight, as many 
speculate that substandard conditions in PE-owned nursing homes 
contributed to the spread of the coronavirus.10    
As others have noted, “[PE acquisitions of healthcare companies] 
are a significant phenomenon with unknown consequences for 
physicians and patients, although they have received little attention 
from researchers and policymakers.”11 Many are quick to jump to 
conclusions on either side of the issue—approaching the topic would 
first require careful consideration of what little empirical research does 
in fact exist. If Medrano and other recent studies suggesting a higher 
prevalence of fraudulent billing and coding practices within private 
equity-owned groups are any indication,12 such concerns may be well 
founded. While private equity is at the center of a recent national hot-
button political debate threatening comprehensive regulatory overhaul, 
it is possible that a less drastic and less costly measure could police 
private equity firms’ fraud within the healthcare industry. Although 
some call for banning private equity acquisitions of healthcare practices 
altogether, extending False Claims Act liability to private equity firms 
 
 8. Health Rsch. Inst., Top Health Industry Issues of 2019: The New Health Economy Comes 
of Age, PWC 30 (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/health-services/pdf/pwc-us-health 
care-top-health-industry-issues-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T66-FMRG]. 
 9. Alia Paavola, Private Equity Healthcare Deals in 2020: 5 Key Report Findings, BECKERS 
HOSPITAL REV. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-
and-valuation/private-equity-healthcare-deals-in-2020-5-key-report-findings.html 
[https://perma.cc/HNA5-NWSV].  
 10. Alex Spanko, Private Equity-Owned Nursing Home Had Higher COVID-19 Infection, 
Fatality Rates: Report, SKILLED NURSING NEWS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://skillednursingnews.com/ 
2020/08/private-equity-owned-nursing-homes-had-higher-covid-19-infection-fatality-rates-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5CC-QHJK]. 
 11. Lawrence P. Casalino, Rayhan Saiani, Sami Bhidya, Dhruv Khullar & Eloise O’Donnell, 
Private Equity Acquisition of Physician Practices, 170 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 114, 114 (2019). 
 12. See Sailesh Konda, Joseph Francis, Kiran Motaparthi & Jane M. Grant-Kels, Future 
Considerations for Clinical Dermatology in the Setting of 21st Century American Policy Reform: 
Corporatization and the Rise of Private Equity in Dermatology, 81 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 
287, 290–91 (2019) (“The fact that 5 of the 30 currently PE-backed practices are represented in the 
top 25 suggests that PE firms may overlook billing practices and focus more on profitability than 
on due diligence when consolidating practices.”). 
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that encourage or orchestrate fraudulent schemes would allow the 
existing regulatory framework to police the more flagrant behavior with 
the threat of the crippling monetary penalties False Claims Act 
violations carry.  
Part I of this Note sets the background framework for the 
discussion that follows, diving deeper into the growing trend of private 
equity in healthcare while also exploring the laws most relevant to 
regulating misconduct specific to the healthcare industry—particularly 
the False Claims Act. Part II seeks to answer the question of whether 
mounting concerns over the increased private equity presence in 
healthcare are well founded through several empirical studies and two 
cases, including Medrano. Concluding that there may be good reason 
for these concerns, Part II then analyzes the ambiguity in how different 
courts apply the False Claims Act to parent corporations as a proxy for 
application to private equity firms, focusing on the question of whether 
the False Claims Act requires a parent company to directly submit false 
claims to the government or rather participate in a fraudulent  
scheme with its portfolio company who then submits false claims to  
the government.  
Finally, Part III proposes that extending False Claims Act 
liability to private equity firms, though unprecedented pre-Medrano, 
provides an immediate and effective way of checking potential abuses 
of private equity firms within healthcare, including increased violations 
of regulations and laws that may lead to a decline in patient care. This 
solution is only feasible, however, if the False Claims Act is interpreted 
in such a way that assigns liability when a private equity firm directly 
participates in fraud the portfolio company commits. This method of 
enforcement is analyzed through the lens of two private equity cases 
wherein a rule that may serve as a test of False Claims Act liability for 
private equity firms going forward may be extracted from the facts of 
the cases.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Private Equity and the Allure of the Healthcare Industry 
One of the most noteworthy shifts characterizing the healthcare 
industry over the past decade has been the dramatic rise in private 
equity acquisitions of healthcare providers.13 The relatively recession-
proof healthcare industry, which continues to outpace the Gross 
Domestic Product in terms of growth rate, offers investors the promise 
 
 13. Id. at 288–89. 
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of consistent market demand and the hope of guaranteed profits.14 This 
Part provides an overview of how private equity firms typically  
function and explores the mutual attraction between PE firms and  
healthcare ventures.  
Using capital invested by pension funds, university 
endowments, high net-worth individuals, and sovereign wealth funds, 
private equity firms typically invest in large and well-managed 
practices with the goal of generating at least twenty percent in annual 
returns.15 By acquiring sixty to eighty percent ownership stakes in a 
target company, the firms take a controlling hold of the business and 
frequently install partners or members of the PE firms on the target 
company’s board, giving the PE firms a voice in strategic decisions and 
business operations moving forward.16 In addition to generating 
significant annual returns, investors seek to grow the value of the 
practice with the end goal of cashing out three to seven years down the 
road by selling to a larger healthcare company, a larger private equity 
firm, an insurance company, or to the public through an initial public 
offering.17 This exit strategy provides the firm with a handsome payout 
as investors with longer-term timeframes take over.  
Private equity activity in the healthcare space has increased 
significantly in the past few years, and industry trends show no signs 
of slowing down. In 2017, the value of disclosed private equity 
healthcare deals rose seventeen percent from 2016, totaling a record 
$42.6 billion.18 The number of deals also rose in 2017, up to 265 from 
206 in 2016.19 2018 again brought record levels of private equity activity 
in healthcare: the value of disclosed deals in 2018 grew nearly fifty 
percent to $63.1 billion, with the number of transactions growing to 
316.20 By all accounts, private equity firms will continue their push into 
 
 14. Patrick D. Souter & Andrew N. Meyercord, Private Equity Investment in the Physician 
Practice: Has Its Time Finally Come or Will the Mistakes of the Past Be Repeated?, 13 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCIS. L. 84, 88 (2020).  
 15. Casalino et al., supra note 11. 
 16. See Joanne Finnegan, Private Equity Companies’ Acquisition of Physician Practices 
Likely to Accelerate, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Jan. 10, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://www.fiercehealth 
care.com/practices/private-equity-companies-acquisition-physician-practices-likely-to-accelerate 
[https://perma.cc/3K7T-WY86]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. BAIN & CO., GLOBAL HEALTHCARE PRIVATE EQUITY AND CORPORATE M&A REPORT 2018, 
at 3 (2018), https://www.bain.com/contentassets/c69b2e6d50314251b83982c206a93361/bain_ 
report_global_healthcare_private_equity_and_corporate_manda_report-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SLW-XEG6]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL HEALTHCARE PRIVATE EQUITY AND CORPORATE M&A REPORT 
2019, at 4 (2019), https://www.bain.com/globalassets/editorial-disruptors/2019/healthcare-pe-
report/bain_report_global_healthcare_private_equity_and_corporate_m_and_a_report_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6H43-GHSS]. 
          
2021] PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 803 
healthcare markets, especially as growing fields, such as telemedicine, 
present enticing new investment opportunities. 
In order to achieve the desired dramatic annual returns, private 
equity firms frequently consolidate their portfolio companies into larger 
groups, using economies of scale to centralize costly services such as 
marketing, billing, scheduling, call centers, information technology, 
health records, and regional management, thereby reducing overhead 
cost.21 Though specialty healthcare industries, such as dermatology, 
urology, and ophthalmology, exhibit the most dramatic rise in private 
equity acquisitions, recent years have shown that the trend is spreading 
to all areas of healthcare, including nursing homes, pharmacies, and 
staffing organizations.22 
As appealing as healthcare practices are to PE firms, buyouts 
also appeal to healthcare ventures and providers. For example, for a 
physician who is looking to give up ownership of her practice, a buyout 
provides a potentially lucrative payout: practice owners typically pocket 
one to two million dollars per physician.23 Partnering with a private 
equity firm may also provide entities with greater access to capital to 
expand the business or cover operating costs, alleviating the burden on 
providers themselves, who may be ill-equipped to handle the 
administrative and managerial demands of overseeing a company.24 
Indeed, healthcare professionals often lack the business acumen 
and legal sophistication to effectively manage a growing entity: 
“[U]nlike any other occupation where management skills are 
important, physicians are neither taught how to lead nor are they 
typically rewarded for good leadership.”25 These considerations weigh 
heavily when an eager PE firm comes knocking on the door with the 
promise of shouldering the administrative tasks and allowing the 
 
 21. Id. at 11–12; Konda et al., supra note 12, at 291. 
 22. See Halee Fischer-Wright, Commentary: What Primary-Care Doctors Should Know Before 
a Private Equity Deal, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 4, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.modern 
healthcare.com/opinion-editorial/commentary-what-primary-care-doctors-should-know-private-
equity-deal [https://perma.cc/CE66-ZNPC] (“Since 2016, . . . private equity has begun spreading its 
net to target primary-care physician groups.”); Margot Sanger-Katz, Julie Creswell & Reed 
Abelson, Mystery Solved: Private-Equity-Backed Firms Are Behind Ad Blitz on ‘Surprise Billing’, 
N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/upshot/surprise-billing-laws-ad-
spending-doctor-patient-unity.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/E7CV-3QBF] 
(discussing two of the largest private equity-owned physician staffing companies). 
 23. COUNCIL ON MED. SERV., AM. MED. ASS’N, CORPORATE INVESTORS 1–2 (2019), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-12/issue-brief-corporate-investors.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/R79G-9PHM]; Finnegan, supra note 16. 
 24. COUNCIL ON MED. SERV., supra note 23, at 2. 
 25. See Lisa S. Rotenstein, Raffaella Sadun & Anupam B. Jena, Why Doctors Need Leadership 
Training, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 17, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/why-doctors-need-leadership-
training [https://perma.cc/G6XF-64KC]. 
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medical professionals to devote more time and energy to what they 
actually care about—the practice of medicine.26  
B. False Claims Act  
To succeed in the healthcare industry, an entrant into the field 
must navigate a complex and oftentimes perplexing web of laws and 
regulations governing public and private conduct of businesses and 
individuals. Various agencies, including the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, 
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, can bring 
enforcement actions against an embattled defendant. Rather than 
producing a treatise of all healthcare law that may implicate PE firms, 
this Note narrows its review to the law most salient to the potential 
frauds that flow from the unchecked activity of healthcare practices 
controlled by PE firms.27  
The federal government’s point of entry in prosecution and 
detection of healthcare fraud is through the federal healthcare 
insurance programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, which come 
with thousands of regulatory strings attached.28 With the very narrow 
exception of specialty practices that operate on a retail or “concierge” 
model, for most healthcare providers, the federal insurance programs—
and Medicare in particular—account for huge revenue streams.29 
Together, Medicare and Medicaid account for forty-three percent of 
 
 26. Paul A. Gomez & Alex S. Kajan, Looking Under the Skin of the Dermatology Acquisition 
Trend, AM. HEALTH L. ASS’N SEMINAR PAPERS, May 10, 2018, Westlaw 20180510 AHLA-SEM 23. 
 27. One important doctrine undergirding any discussion of investor involvement in 
healthcare is the ancient corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The doctrine exists in a majority 
of states, either through statutes, regulations, or common law jurisprudence, and “prohibits 
corporations from engaging in the practice of medicine by directly employing or otherwise 
controlling a physician’s practice of medicine.” Mary Anne Bobinski, Law and Power in Health 
Care: Challenges to Physician Control, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 595, 606 (2019). The most important 
justification for the doctrine highlights the importance of a physician-patient relationship that is 
untainted by external pressures and organizational controls. Id. at 606–07. While the doctrine is 
“somewhat archaic” and has varying levels of enforcement throughout the states, it is a critical 
consideration whenever considering an arrangement between a physician and a nonphysician. 
THOMAS C. FOX, CAROL COLBORN LOEPERE & JOSEPH W. METRO, HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 10:22 (2019), Westlaw HTHCFTM; see also Melesa Freerks, Colleen 
McKnight, Jay Munisteri & Torrey Young, Corporate Practice of Medicine—“A Bad Penny Always 
Turns Up,” 20 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 17, 19 (2018) (“Situations in which a non-licensed 
entity (i.e., a private equity firm) attempts to control the medical decisionmaking of a licensed 
provider . . . are more likely to encounter compliance scrutiny . . . .”). 
 28. Bailey Wendzel, Ian Deitz, Nicholas Engle, David Favre, Andrea Fenster, Nikolas Foran 
& Allen Gehring, Health Care Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2019). 
 29. Drew Altman & William H. Frist, Medicare and Medicaid at 50 Years: Perspectives of 
Beneficiaries, Health Care Professionals and Institutions, and Policy Makers, 314 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 384, 388 (2015). 
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hospital revenues.30 Profitability depends, however, on federal 
reimbursements. By accepting federal reimbursements, a physician, 
hospital, or healthcare company agrees to accept the conditions 
attached to the funds; failure to take heed can and does lead to crippling 
liability under laws such as the False Claims Act. 
A relic from the Civil War brought back from near statutory 
extinction, the False Claims Act (“FCA” or “the Act”) functions as the 
primary tool for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to recover 
judgments and settlements in civil healthcare fraud cases against the 
government.31 The Act was “originally passed in response to rampant 
fraud perpetrated against the United States military . . . by selling it 
sick mules, lame horses, sawdust instead of gunpowder, and rotted 
ships with fresh paint.”32 It allows a private party relator to bring a qui 
tam action on the government’s behalf and be rewarded with fifty 
percent of the recovery.33 The whistleblower is usually an employee 
(often recently fired) who uncovered damaging information about  
the employer. 
Under its original formulation, anyone who “knowingly 
submitted false claims to the government” could be held liable for 
“double the government’s damages plus a penalty of $2,000 for each 
false claim.”34 The Act, however, largely faded into oblivion for the latter 
half of the twentieth century after a 1943 congressional amendment 
severely gutted jurisdiction—but by 1986, Congress had grown 
frustrated with the ballooning problem of fraud on the government that 
law enforcement was not properly addressing.35  
In response, Congress passed amendments that resuscitated the 
Act’s bite by restoring jurisdiction when the relator—the private party 
whistleblower who initiates the claim—was the original source of the 
 
 30. Id. at 384. 
 31. See Thomas Reilly, Comment, The Extrapolation Conundrum: Finding a Unified Theory 
for the Use of Statistical Sampling in Medicare Fraud Cases Brought Under the False Claims Act, 
47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1103, 1104 (“For many years, the federal government has considered the 
False Claims Act . . . to be its primary instrument in preventing fraud against the government.”). 
 32. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers $2.8 Billion from False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 
[https://perma.cc/7ZEJ-KDGJ]. 
 33. See also Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic 
Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 459–60 (1998) (explaining that a 
congressional amendment to the Act in 1943 resulted in fewer qui tam actions, though use of the 
Act to fight government fraud increased). 
 34. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 1 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALG-
6JV2].  
 35. Meador & Warren, supra note 33, at 460. 
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inculpatory information.36 This led to an explosion of FCA suits, many 
in healthcare. Since the 1986 amendments, settlements and judgments 
awarded through the FCA top thirty billion dollars.37 In 2018 alone, the 
Department of Justice recovered over $2.8 billion in FCA cases, $2.5 
billion of which involved healthcare.38 Indeed, the FCA penalties for 
violations can be crippling: as of 2016, the penalty per claim ranges 
between $10,781.40 and $21,562.80, on top of treble damages the 
federal government incurs as a result of the false claims.39 For providers 
submitting dozens of claims per day, the penalties can quickly 
skyrocket into the millions. Important to note, however, is that the high 
damages serve dual purposes: not only do they penalize wrongdoers, but 
they also provide a much higher incentive for whistleblowers, who 
pocket a percentage of the reward, to come forward.40   
Under its current formulation, liability under the FCA attaches 
when a party “knowingly submits a false claim to the government or 
causes another to submit a false claim to the government or knowingly 
makes a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the 
government.”41 Though there is no developed case law examining how 
the FCA applies to PE firms, several cases have ruled on how parent 
companies can be held liable when involved in fraud perpetrated by 
their subsidiaries. Much of the legal discourse in these cases involves 
interpretation of the causation element: how and when does a parent 
cause a subsidiary to submit a false claim to the government?  
In 2016, the Supreme Court “rocked the world of False Claims 
Act litigation”42 by handing down its ruling in Universal Health Services 
v. United States ex rel Escobar.43 Escobar confirmed the validity of the 
“implied false certification” theory of False Claims Act liability.44 Under 
the implied false certification theory, by submitting a claim for 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS – HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: OCTOBER 1, 1986–
SEPTEMBER 30, 2017, at 1–2 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1020116/ 
download [https://perma.cc/2KSL-FAH9]. 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 32. 
 39. 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2020). See Wendy K. Arends, Sean O’D. Bosack & Thomas N. Shorter, 
False Claims Act Penalties Double as of August 1, 2016, NAT’L L. REV. (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/false-claims-act-penalties-double-august-1-2016 
[https://perma.cc/NA87-GKPE] (“As of August 1, 2016, False Claims Act civil penalties increase to 
between $10,781.40 and $21,562.80 per claim, plus three times the amount of damages that the 
federal government sustains because of the false claim.”).   
 40. Arends et al., supra note 39. 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 34. See also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 42. Jeff Overley, One Year Later, Escobar Is Roiling FCA Landscape, LAW360 (June 16, 2017, 
4:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/933393 [https://perma.cc/E6E4-6CGY].  
 43. 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
 44. Id. at 1995. 
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reimbursement, a provider “impliedly certifies compliance with all 
conditions of payment. But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant’s 
violation of a material statutory . . . requirement, . . . the defendant has 
made a misrepresentation that renders the claim ‘false or 
fraudulent’ . . . .”45 The Court developed a two-part test for liability 
under the implied certification theory: (1) the claim for payment “makes 
specific representations about the goods or services provided”; and (2) 
“failure to disclose noncompliance with material 
statutory . . . requirements makes those representations misleading 
half-truths.”46  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. A Cause for Concern  
The staggering and rapid growth of PE activity does not come 
without some risk, and the recent recharacterization of ownership has 
led to growing concerns from medical professionals: “At the current 
pace, by the time more is understood about the takeover . . . by private 
equity firms, it will likely be too late to change course. Efforts to protect 
the field . . . and the American public from the potential adverse 
consequences should begin now.”47 This Section begins with an analysis 
of the possible risks and benefits posed by private equity takeovers 
within healthcare. 
1. Potential Risks and Benefits 
Unlike acquisitions made by healthcare systems or hospitals, 
which tend to envision the target acquisitions as part of long-term 
strategic growth, PE firms are laser focused on making short-term 
financial gains before washing their hands of the target. Chief among 
the worries commentators espouse are parallel concerns regarding a 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2001. Lower courts have had difficulty applying Escobar, resulting in circuit splits 
over several of the issues decided in the case, including whether satisfying this two-part test is a 
necessary precondition to liability under the implied certification theory. See Conor Duffy, Ninth 
Circuit Issues Long-Awaited Interpretation of Escobar Two-Part Test, HEALTH L. DIAGNOSIS (Sept. 
20, 2018), https://www.healthlawdiagnosis.com/2018/09/ninth-circuit-issues-long-awaited-
interpretation-of-escobar-two-part-test/ [https://perma.cc/9TGG-UAG9] (“The Ninth Circuit was 
asked to determine whether that language in Escobar makes satisfying those two requirements a 
necessary precondition to proving falsity under the implied false certification theory, or 
whether . . . while satisfying that test is sufficient to establish falsity, it is not mandatory.”). 
 47. Joshua M. Sharfstein & Jamar Slocum, Private Equity and Dermatology—First, Do No 
Harm, 155 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 1007, 1008 (2019). 
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decline in patient care and a pressure to violate regulations and laws,48 
a classic corporatization-of-medicine dilemma pitting profit 
optimization in one corner and patient care in the other.49 The drive to 
generate short-term gains pressures providers to “increase volumes of 
patients seen per day, to overprescribe diagnostic tests or perform 
unnecessary procedures, or to save on costs by using shoddier but less 
costly supplies and devices.”50 As one scholar noted: “[I]t is difficult to 
imagine investors from most [private equity] firms weighing patient 
care and physician values over profits when making strategic decisions 
over time.”51  
This may be particularly acute in the case of PE firms that invest 
in many different sectors of the economy: customary techniques used to 
add value to a target company in, say, the retail or manufacturing 
sector—by generating lower costs and increased revenues—often 
translate to “lower quality and worse patient outcomes” when 
conducted within the healthcare space.52 Fundamentally, private equity 
firms are working under the pressure of a fiduciary duty to return 
capital to their investors, so they might invest in healthcare without 
understanding the regulations—like the FCA or the Anti-Kickback 
Statute—surrounding government reimbursements, which prohibit 
conduct that is typical to investment strategies outside of healthcare.53 
Strategic efforts, such as wooing potential clients with courtside tickets 
or engaging in a mutually beneficial quid pro quo with a supplier, 
commonplace in other sectors, are strictly verboten in healthcare due to 
concerns that such tactics could taint medical judgment. Violating laws 
 
 48. See, e.g., Suhas Gondi & Zirui Song, Potential Implications of Private Equity Investments 
in Health Care Delivery, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1047, 1047 (2019) (“[T]he need for generating 
returns may create pressure to increase utilization, direct referrals internally to capture revenue 
from additional services, and rely on care delivered by unsupervised allied clinicians.”). 
 49. See Shriji N. Patel, Sylvia Groth & Paul Sternberg Jr., The Emergence of Private Equity 
in Ophthalmology, 137 JAMA OPHTHALMOLOGY 601, 602 (2019) (“[T]he corporatization of medicine 
opens the door for optimizing profits at the expense of patient care.”). 
 50. Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, Private Equity Buyouts in Healthcare: Who Wins, 
Who Loses? 5 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y & Rsch., Working Paper No. 118, 2020). 
 51. Jack S. Resneck, Jr., Dermatology Practice Consolidation Fueled by Private Equity 
Investment: Potential Consequences for the Specialty and Patients, 154 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 13, 
13–14 (2018). 
 52. Sean Shenghsiu Huang & John R. Bowblis, Private Equity Ownership and Nursing Home 
Quality: An Instrumental Variables Approach, 19 INT’L J. HEALTH ECON. & MGMT. 273, 274 (2019). 
 53. See Evan M. Chen, Jacob T. Cox, Tedi Begaj, Grayson W. Armstrong, Rahul N. Khurana 
& Ravi Parikh, Private Equity in Ophthalmology and Optometry: Analysis of Acquisitions from 
2012 to 2019 in the United States, 127 OPHTHALMOLOGY 445, 452 (2020) (noting that “[t]he added 
pressure of a fiduciary commitment to return investor capital in the short term may decrease PE 
firms’ incentive to enforce clinical practice guidelines”). 
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prohibiting such conduct, like the Anti-Kickback Statute and the 
Physician Self-Referral Law (“Stark”), carries hefty liability.54  
In addition to the potential threats that are acute to the 
healthcare industry, several broader PE-related concerns may also 
ultimately contribute to a decline in the value of care. As one scholar 
described it, the “low-risk/high-reward nature of the PE business model 
for the PE firm is a classic case of moral hazard . . . [resulting] in 
excessive risk-taking by the PE firm, using other people’s money . . . .”55 
In the context of a leveraged buyout, the high debt load could render 
the portfolio company unable to make payments on the debt, 
threatening bankruptcy,56 which does not affect the PE firm once the 
exit strategy has been employed.  
How, exactly, might these concerns manifest in the day-to-day 
operations of a PE-backed practice? Consider this simple scenario: a PE 
firm acquires a practice in a leveraged buyout—using high levels of debt 
to gain its controlling share—and plans to sell the practice for profit in 
four years, expecting to generate annual returns of twenty percent for 
its investors. Furthermore, in an acquisition effectuated through debt 
financing, as is typical in a PE acquisition, management must also 
devote a significant amount of revenue to interest payments and debt 
reduction.57 The firm implements some above-board cost-cutting 
measures, such as staff consolidation, but fails to see the expected 
returns. In this scenario, the firm may seek additional margins by 
“promoting out-of-pocket procedures, increased surgical volumes, and 
unnecessary testing.”58 These seemingly benign benchmarks translate 
to a higher cost and lower quality of care when applied to healthcare. 
To be sure, these cost-cutting and profit-generating avenues are in no 
way unique to PE ownership, but in a practice largely controlled by PE 
interests, medical professionals will have less of an opportunity to 
meaningfully express any concerns or opposition.59  
That is not to say, however, that academics are in unanimous 
agreement that all PE activity leads to undesirable results. Advocates 
of PE in healthcare note that the PE capital can “curb costs, improve 
efficiencies, and infuse capital . . . to finance new technologies, upgrade 
 
 54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b), 1395nn. 
 55. Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 50, at 8. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Huang & Bowblis, supra note 52, at 276–77 (“The use of debt can have negative 
consequences by increasing the amount of revenue that must be devoted to interest payments and 
paying down debt instead of reinvesting in quality improvement efforts.”). 
 58. Patel et al., supra note 49, at 602. 
 59. See id. (“However, when physicians have already surrendered control, they are unable to 
combat these changes whether or not they agree with management.”). 
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facilities, and consolidate fragmented markets.”60 A study by Nicholas 
Bloom et al. noted that, at least in other industries, PE-owned 
companies have notably better management practices “than almost all 
other ownership groups such as family-run, founder owned, or 
government owned firms.”61 Particular benefits associated with PE 
ownership include improved operational practices, greater delegation of 
authority, and stronger incentive practices.62 Other studies have found 
that PE ownership limits opportunism among management, generates 
stronger incentives for management, provides better incentives for 
promotion and continued employment, and improves oversight.63  
2. Empirical Risk  
To provide stronger justification for actions taken to curb the 
excesses of private equity within healthcare, it should be established 
that some of the risks that inspired concern among those in the industry 
have actually come to pass in a systemic way, as opposed to in only a 
couple of case studies. Unfortunately, another hallmark of PE firms—
the stark lack of transparency in their business operations facilitated 
by few reporting requirements and many nondisclosure agreements—
has made drawing conclusions difficult for healthcare researchers.64 In 
recent years, however, several studies have emerged that examine 
discrete sectors of the healthcare industry—namely, dermatology 
practices and nursing homes. Taken together, it may be possible to 
extract a conclusion about the effect of PE ownership on healthcare 
ventures in general. 
Several pre-COVID-19 studies of PE nursing home acquisitions 
revealed lower qualities of care in those PE-owned facilities, reporting 
“lower staffing levels, an increase in lower skilled providers, and worse 
performance in a variety of nursing measures.”65 Atul Gupta et al. 
 
 60. Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 50, at 4. 
 61. Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadum & John Van Reenen, Do Private Equity Owned Firms 
Have Better Management Practices?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 442 (2015); see also Mark Brandon 
Lainoff, Leveraging the Future of Healthcare: Private Equity’s Changing Role in Healthcare 
Delivery, Performance, and Quality, J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Winter 2020, at 1, 5 (discussing the 
Bloom study). 
 62. Bloom et al., supra note 61, at 442. 
 63. See Lainoff, supra note 61, at 5. 
 64. See Barry Ritholtz, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Need Full Disclosure, BLOOMBERG: 
OP. (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-19/hedge-
funds-private-equity-venture-capital-need-full-disclosure [https://perma.cc/DP67-V2K9] (“Unlike 
mutual funds or exchange-traded funds, [private equity funds] don’t have to provide much in the 
way of transparency. . . . They don’t even have to disclose the identity of their senior managers.”). 
 65. Chen et al., supra note 53, at 452. But cf. Huang & Bowblis, supra note 52, at 295 (“These 
results . . . provide evidence that PE ownership does not deteriorate [nursing home] quality. . . . 
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conducted a comprehensive study of PE-acquired nursing homes using 
data from 2000 to 2017 and found significant evidence of declines in 
both patient health and compliance with care standards.66 The authors 
of the study reasoned the declines were due to the “particular 
incentives” PE managers have, as distinct from the incentives of non-
PE corporations or chains, where no such evidence of declines was found 
post-acquisition.67 These “particular incentives,” of course, come down 
to the difference between a PE firm’s need for short-term gains versus 
a corporation’s typically longer-term investment strategy where 
gradual returns are acceptable. Notably, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the decline in patient health was accompanied by a decline in 
compliance with federal guidelines.68  
Importantly, studies suggesting lower quality of care do not 
necessarily implicate fraudulent conduct (though regulatory violations 
can form the basis of an FCA claim). A recent study of dermatology 
practices, however, found through an analysis of billing records that 
PE-backed dermatology groups were statistically overrepresented as 
extreme outliers in billing the highest reimbursement rates—billing 
more frequently for the most expensive procedures than their non-PE 
backed counterparts.69 The study used information from the 2015 
Medicare Part B physician payment data set, focusing on 
reimbursement code 88305, representing the highest reimbursement 
rate paid by the federal reimbursement programs.70 The study compiled 
a list of the top twenty-five billers of code 88305; of the top twenty-five, 
five private equity-backed practices were represented, amounting to 
seventeen percent (five out of thirty) of the private equity-backed 
dermatology practices in operation.71  
These findings suggest that “PE firms may overlook billing 
practices and focus more on profitability than on due diligence when 
[considering] practices.”72 Put another way, the firms may choose 
medical procedures based on the lucrative reimbursement rate rather 
than on sound medical judgment and medical necessity, which will 
 
Despite a growing and significant role in healthcare markets, our knowledge of PE ownership in 
healthcare firms is still very limited and many questions remain unanswered.”). 
 66. Atul Gupta, Sabrina T. Howell, Constantine Yannelis & Abhinav Gupta, Does Private 
Equity Investment in Healthcare Benefit Patients? Evidence from Nursing Homes 1–2, 11, 30–31 
(Nov. 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3537612 [perma.cc/KXW6-Z34E]. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Konda et al., supra note 12, at 290–91. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 291. 
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ultimately have a negative impact on value of care. Though the facts of 
any individual scenario will dictate the outcome, this type of situation 
runs dangerously close to conduct prohibited by the FCA.  
3. COVID-19 
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, nursing homes were 
recognized as infection hot spots, bringing the quality-of-care issue into 
the national spotlight, particularly as it related to PE-owned nursing 
homes. In the face of the nursing home death toll, critics waged attacks 
against PE’s cost-cutting methods, like reduced staffing: “Decades of 
ownership by private equity . . . left many nursing homes with 
staggering bills and razor-thin margins . . . . Even so, many of their 
owners still found creative ways to wring profits out of them . . . .”73  
One report looked into the pandemic’s toll on nursing homes in 
New Jersey. In the state, about seventy-five percent of nursing homes 
are for-profit; of those, nearly twenty-five percent are either owned, 
operated, or financially supported by PE firms.74 Using data from the 
New Jersey Department of Health, the study found that the infection 
rate among nursing home residents was 24.5 percent higher in PE 
nursing homes than the average of nursing homes in the state.75 The 
fatality rate in PE nursing homes was 10.2 percent higher than the 
statewide average.76 The study went on to find similar disparities in 
nursing home staff infection and fatality rates.77   
The report’s authors attribute the infection and fatality rates to 
“lower quality, lower staffing, and higher numbers of deficiencies for 
failing to meet federal standards” in PE nursing homes.78 They note 
that patients in PE-owned and backed nursing homes received 
significantly fewer hours of nursing care per patient per day—twenty 
percent less than at nursing homes with other ownership types, leading 
to higher instances of deficiency violations.79  
 
 73. Matthew Goldstein, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Push for Profits Left 
Nursing Homes Struggling to Provide Care, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2020/05/07/business/coronavirus-nursing-homes.html [https://perma.cc/7F5J-M459]. 
 74. AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM EDUC. FUND, THE DEADLY COMBINATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND 
NURSING HOMES DURING A PANDEMIC: NEW JERSEY CASE STUDY OF CORONAVIRUS AT PRIVATE 
EQUITY NURSING HOMES 2 (2020), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ 
AFREF-NJ-Private-Equity-Nursing-Homes-Covid.pdf [https://perma.cc/M965-WEN3].  
 75. Id. at 2, 14. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. Id. at 3. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
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Though the predominant media narrative has been that PE-
owned nursing homes are faring worse than their non-PE peers, some 
evidence might suggest otherwise: one study found that nursing homes 
currently owned or backed by PE firms were actually less likely to have 
outbreaks and had greater personal protective equipment (“PPE”) 
availability.80 Prior PE ownership, however, correlated to a greater 
likelihood of outbreaks and resident deaths and decreased PPE 
availability than the average.81 This could implicate the concerns 
expressed earlier over how PE firms extract value from the portfolio and 
leave it with an unmanageable debt load after exiting the investment. 
The available data is slim, but these studies suggest that the 
concerns about PE healthcare ownership are well founded, presenting 
evidence of a decrease in quality of care and increased regulatory and 
compliance violations. These violations, when accompanied by federal 
reimbursements, often lay the groundwork for False Claims actions.  
B. Fraud in Action  
Two recent cases—one settled and one ongoing as of April 
2021—provide a glimpse into how PE firms prioritize profits over 
patients and lay the groundwork for examining the FCA as applied to 
PE firms. The first, United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, 
LLC, marks the first time the DOJ pursued an FCA case against a PE 
firm for its involvement in its portfolio’s conduct, signaling a new class 
of defendants. 82 
1. Medrano  
Patient Care America (“PCA”) was founded in 2006 as Diabetic 
Care Rx LLC (before a subsequent name change) as a sterile 
compounding pharmacy that provided end-stage renal disease patients 
with intravenous nutritional therapy.83 In 2012, Riordan, Lewis & 
 
 80. Ashvin Gandhi, YoungJun Song & Prabhava Upadrashta, Have Private Equity Owned 
Nursing Homes Fared Worse Under COVID-19? 8 (Oct. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3682892 [https://perma.cc/3XKE-5CZH]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle, 2019 WL 1054125 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019). 
 83. United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC, No. 15-CV-62617-
BLOOM/VALLE, 2018 WL 6978633, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2018). For purposes of clarity, I will 
use “PCA” when referring to the company, regardless of whether the name had been officially 
changed from DCRX. A compounding pharmacy is a pharmacy that mixes or combines ingredients 
to create a prescription unique to a patient’s individual needs. Compounding and the FDA: 
Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/human-drug-
compounding/compounding-and-fda-questions-and-answers (last updated June 21, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/KCT9-M92W]. 
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Haden (“RLH”), a Los Angeles-based private equity firm, acquired a 
controlling investment in the company. RLH hoped to turn around and 
sell PCA for profit within five years of its initial investment.84 RLH was 
no stranger to healthcare: it held several healthcare companies, 
including a compounding pharmacy similar to PCA.85 To ensure the 
profitability of PCA, RLH appointed partners Kenneth Hubbs and 
Michel Glouchevitch as officers of PCA.86   
Unfortunately for RLH, one year after it secured ownership of 
PCA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to cut dialysis treatment 
reimbursement rates by twelve percent.87 The Final Rule solidifying 
these changes was published in December 2013.88 The prospects were 
chilling for providers in the field: estimates suggested that 55.6 percent 
of facilities would suffer negative Medicare margins as a result of the 
cuts.89 RLH, already one year into its five-year plan, became desperate 
for a new profitmaking strategy.90  
Glouchevitch and Hubbs set their sights on a potentially 
lucrative area of reimbursement: nonsterile compounding of topical 
creams.91 The creams carried a federal reimbursement rate ranging 
from $1,000 to $8,000 per prescription—and a ninety percent profit 
margin.92 RLH quickly put the wheels in motion and hired a CEO and 
other industry veterans to implement the plan.93  
Topical compounding promised to give RLH exactly what it 
needed: a quick payoff for a short-term investment. Correctly predicting 
that CMS would soon lower the staggeringly high profit margins for the 
creams,94 RLH knew that it had to act quickly to extract as much value 
 
 84. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *1. 
 85. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 10. RLH still appears to have a robust 
healthcare portfolio. See Selections from Our Portfolio, RLH EQUITY PARTNERS, http://www.rlh 
equity.com/portfolio/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4YX8-NJA4] (discussing RLH’s 
various healthcare investments). 
 86. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 87. Diane Wish, Doug Johnson & Jay Wish, Rebasing the Medicare Payment for Dialysis: 
Rationale, Challenges, and Opportunities, 9 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 2195–96 (2014). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 2196. 
 90. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 10 (“Restoring DCRX’s profitability became 
RLH’s primary objective.”). 
 91. United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC, No. 15-CV-62617-
BLOOM/VALLE, 2018 WL 6978633, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2018); Complaint in Intervention, 
supra note 3, at 10. 
 92. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 11. Interestingly, it appears that RLH’s 
predictions regarding the short-lived nature of the high profit margins were correct. A 625 percent 
increase in Medicare spending on compounded drugs from 2006 to 2015 caused the OIG to 
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as possible in a short amount of time. The only way to achieve this was, 
in the words of Glouchevitch, to “make hay while the sun shines.”95  
PCA outsourced the task of drumming up patient referrals to 
three external marketing companies, whose sole obligation was to 
target and refer patients for PCA prescriptions.96 RLH approved of this 
plan, despite the Anti-Kickback Statute’s prohibition on providing 
referrals in exchange for compensation.97 The scheme functioned as 
follows: the marketers targeted TRICARE beneficiaries and secured the 
patient’s consent to accept the free compounded creams.98 PCA then 
sent the patient’s information to an out-of-state telemedicine physician, 
who, with no physical examinations and often no consultations at all, 
wrote the prescriptions and sent them to PCA.99 PCA billed TRICARE 
for the reimbursement.100 In exchange for providing referrals, the 
marketers shared in fifty percent of the profits generated.101 RLH 
fronted $2 million dollars to pay the marketers’ commissions,102 despite 
warning from counsel that “paying commissions to marketers could 
violate the AKS and that compliance with the AKS was a material 
requirement for reimbursement from TRICARE.”103 
Within months, the scheme soared past projections: PCA’s 2015 
annual budget projected the year’s net compounding revenues to be 
$51.2 million; by April 2015, PCA had already accumulated $69 million 
in net revenue from the compounding creams.104 But as alleged, the 
marketing scheme violated the Anti-Kickback Statute’s prohibition on 
providing referrals in exchange for compensation.  
The case first came before a U.S. Magistrate Judge for the 
Southern District of Florida, who filed a Report and Recommendation 
to the District Judge on November 30, 2018.105 With regards to the 
marketing scheme, the magistrate judge found causation satisfied: RLH 
 
recommend CMS change its coverage policies. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., QUESTIONABLE BILLING FOR COMPOUNDED TOPICAL DRUGS IN MEDICARE PART D 
1, 17–18 (2018). 
 95. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 11. 
 96. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *3. 
 97. Id. at *11. 
 98. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 3, at 20. 
 99. Id. The conduct of the telemedicine doctors was clearly illegal and has resulted in several 
criminal convictions against the prescribing doctors for health care fraud. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *11. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The United States of America’s First Amended Complaint in Intervention at 19–20, 
United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC, No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 6, 2019), 2019 WL 1054125, at *16 [hereinafter First Amended Complaint in Intervention]. 
 105. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *1. 
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caused PCA to submit false claims.106 RLH squarely opposed this 
conclusion, advancing a theory of causation that would require RLH’s 
involvement with PCA on a granular level—involvement in the day-to-
day operations of the marketers, managing the conduct of PCA 
employees, and approving the actual marketing contracts, rather than 
directing the contracts be executed.107 The judge rejected RLH’s 
proposition, pointing to RLH’s approval of the marketing agreements, 
knowledge of the AKS prohibition on kickbacks, and fronting of the $2 
million to pay the marketers.108  
On March 6, 2019, the district judge issued an Order Adopting 
in Part Report and Recommendations, dismissing the claims against 
RLH without prejudice.109 The district court judge, in agreement with 
the magistrate judge, dismissed the claim for a different reason: she 
found that the complaint failed to properly state a presentment claim.110 
The district court judge did not issue an opinion on whether RLH 
caused the false claims to be submitted.111 Twelve days after its 
complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead a claim 
under either an express or implied certification theory, the United 
States filed its amended complaint.112 Despite RLH’s insistence that a 
PE firm should not be held liable for conduct involving its portfolio 
company, a historic settlement was reached six months later.113  
2. Martino-Fleming  
Although Medrano was the first instance where the DOJ 
brought FCA charges against a PE firm for conduct related to its 
portfolio company, another FCA relator filed a complaint seeking to 
hold a PE firm liable for the conduct of its portfolio company just three 
months before the Medrano complaint. This case, United States ex rel. 
Martino-Fleming,114 was still ongoing as of spring 2021.115 
Interestingly, of the two complaints filed just months apart, the DOJ 
 
 106. Id. at *12–13. 
 107. Riordan, Lewis & Haden, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Government’s Complaint in 
Intervention at 9–11, United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC, No. 15-62617-CIV-
BLOOM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019), 2018 WL 1980692. 
 108. Medrano, 2018 WL 6978633, at *12. 
 109. United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care RX, LLC, No. 15-cv-62617-BLOOM/Valle, 
2019 WL 1054125, at *1, *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019). 
 110. Id. at *7. 
 111. Id.  
 112. First Amended Complaint in Intervention, supra note 104, at *16. 
 113. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 1. 
 114. United States ex rel. Martino-Fleming v. S. Bay Mental Health Ctr., Inc., No. 15-13065-
PBS, 2018 BL 342655 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2018). 
 115. See id. (displaying multiple filings in January 2021). 
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elected to intervene only in Medrano. Undeterred by the federal 
government’s failure to intervene, however, Martino-Fleming continues 
to pursue her claim.  
The case involves South Bay, a mental health center in 
Massachusetts.116 H.I.G. Capital, a private equity firm, and H.I.G. 
Growth, the capital-investment affiliate of H.I.G. Capital, purchased 
South Bay in April 2012 following due diligence.117 South Bay received 
reimbursements from MassHealth, the Massachusetts Medicare 
program, which both the federal and Massachusetts state governments 
finance, thus opening the door to federal FCA liability.118 As a condition 
of reimbursement, MassHealth has certain licensing and supervision 
requirements for staff therapists.119 The relator, Christine Martino-
Fleming, a South Bay employee, alleged that a substantial majority of 
the South Bay-employed therapists and other professionals were not 
properly licensed or supervised.120 An internal investigation discovered 
that “over 60 percent of regional directors, over 80 percent of  
clinical directors, and over 75 percent of supervisors across all  
South Bay facilities were not properly licensed according to  
MassHealth regulations.”121  
Martino-Fleming further alleged that she informed the South 
Bay board—composed of five directors, three of whom were directors or 
principals at PE firm H.I.G.—that these licensing and supervisory 
problems violated state regulations and needed to be addressed by 
hiring more licensed supervisors.122 The PE-controlled board rejected 
her recommendation, and South Bay continued operating as it had done 
in the past.123  
Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts held that the PE firm could be held 
liable “where the submission of false claims by another entity was the 
foreseeable result of a business practice.”124 The court held the board’s 
conduct in rejecting the recommendation that would “bring South Bay 
into regulatory compliance” constituted “sufficient participation in the 
claims process to trigger FCA liability.”125 The court reasoned that a 
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parent could be held liable for a subsidiary’s false claims submissions if 
the parent was directly involved in the claims process.126 By virtue of 
the fact that H.I.G. members comprised a majority of the South Bay 
board and had direct involvement in South Bay’s operations, the  
court found H.I.G. could be held liable and denied H.I.G.’s motion  
to dismiss.127  
C. Parent Liability Under the False Claims Act 
“Where a private equity firm takes an active role in illegal 
conduct by the acquired company, it can expose itself to False Claims 
Act liability.”128 During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in June 
2020, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ethan P. Davis 
delivered a speech addressing how the DOJ would police violations of 
the terms and conditions attached to the billions of dollars distributed 
to healthcare providers through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act.129 In the speech, he flaunted the enforcement 
actions taken against Riordan, Lewis, and Haden—the PE firm in 
Medrano—as a cautionary tale to PE firms, illustrating they are now 
fair game for the DOJ under the FCA.130  
In Medrano and Martino-Fleming, the PE firms exercised 
varying degrees of direction and control over the fraudulent schemes 
the portfolio companies were operating to generate revenue. The 
conduct alleged is indicative of the concerns voiced above: as profits took 
priority over patient outcomes, regulations designed to protect quality 
and value-of-care were disregarded. Despite the PE firms’ involvement 
in these schemes, the law is less than clear on how FCA liability should 
apply in the context of PE ownership.  
The existing doctrines in this area have established frameworks 
to handle corporation-employee relationships and parent company-
subsidiary relationships within the FCA context;131 however, trying to 
fit the PE relationship into either of these boxes has its challenges. On 
a basic level, a PE fund typically has limited partners who are each 
individual owners in the fund, which is in turn managed by an 
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investment management company on behalf of the fund’s investors.132 
The management company makes the investment decisions for the 
fund.133 At its core, the PE fund is the equivalent of a collective group 
of individual investors, which does not function the same way  
as a corporate body, so parent-subsidiary comparisons may  
seem attenuated.  
Whatever the structural dissimilarities may be, it is difficult to 
see them as anything other than technicalities when the essence and 
function of the relationships are the same. At the very least, there is 
room for argument to reject a formalist approach to the rules and to 
functionally extend their reach to PE firms. The few courts that have 
touched on this issue looked past the structural barriers to the essence 
of the relationship between PE and portfolio and were satisfied with the 
parent-subsidiary view, despite protests from PE attorneys.134  
Within the parent-subsidiary context, courts have developed 
doctrines to determine a parent corporation’s FCA liability.135 These 
judge-made doctrines stem from statutory interpretations of one key 
element of FCA liability: that the defendant cause a false claim to be 
submitted for reimbursement (from Medicare, Medicaid, etc.).136 The 
general rule of parent liability is that parent corporations are not liable 
for a subsidiary’s FCA violations simply by virtue of being a parent 
corporation.137 Similarly, general control over a subsidiary is 
insufficient for liability.138 To trigger liability against the parent, the 
plaintiff must present evidence that the parent played a role in 
 
 132. See James Garrett Baldwin, What Is the Structure of a Private Equity Fund?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/093015/understanding-private-
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management companies). 
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15-13065-PBS, 2018 BL 342655, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2018) (applying traditional parent-
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submitting claims for reimbursement.139 In one oft-cited case, conduct 
supporting parent liability included the parent reviewing and giving 
input to the subsidiary’s cost reports submitted for reimbursement and 
corresponding with fiscal intermediaries.140 Additionally, if a parent or 
other third party establishes a policy as to how the subsidiary submits 
its claims, liability may also be triggered.141  
Comparing corporate liability cases, however, reveals 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in how these principles are applied. 
The ambiguity stems from the parent’s involvement in the claim 
submission process. One line of cases requires direct involvement and 
oversight of the claims and cost reports being submitted. Another line 
of cases, more frequently involving third parties as opposed to parent 
corporations, applies a looser standard that is satisfied by a parent’s 
involvement in the fraudulent scheme, without granular focus on the 
physical process of submitting claims or overseeing cost reports. The 
differing applications have immense implications for how PE firms will 
be held liable under the FCA. Several representative cases below 
illustrate the difference. 
1. Direct Involvement in Claims 
One case that illustrates the more demanding approach is 
United States ex rel. Schaengold v. Memorial Health, Inc.—an Eleventh 
Circuit 2014 case. 142 In Schaengold, defendants were parent company 
Memorial Health, Inc. and subsidiaries Memorial Health University 
Medical Center (“Memorial Hospital”), Provident Health Services 
(“Provident”), and Memorial Health University Physicians 
(“MHUP”).143 The government alleged a complicated scheme by the 
defendants that resulted in Memorial System, the health system owned 
and operated by Memorial Health, compensating physicians in excess 
of fair market value.144 The physicians in turn referred Medicare 
patients to Memorial Hospital, which billed Medicare for 
reimbursement; this compensation arrangement violated the Stark 
Statute and effectively rendered the claims false under the FCA.145   
The court dismissed the claims against every party except 
Memorial Hospital—the subsidiary directly involved in submitting the 
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falsely certified cost reports to the government.146 The court reasoned 
that direct involvement in claims submission was the sine qua non—an 
absolutely essential condition—to FCA liability: “[M]ere participation 
in a scheme that results in an eventual submission of a false claim is 
not sufficient for FCA liability.”147 Without that essential element, any 
other fraudulent conduct by the parent was irrelevant. Allegations that 
the parent, Memorial Health, organized and set up the fraudulent 
compensation arrangements that led directly to the subsidiary, 
Memorial Hospital, submitting those false claims constituted 
insufficient involvement in the submission process.148 
The Central District of Illinois reached a similar result in United 
States v. Safeway, Inc.149 Defendant Safeway operated multiple 
pharmacies including its subsidiary, Dominick’s.150 The complaint 
alleged that Safeway “directed and supervised the transition of 
Dominick’s pharmacy” to a fraudulent billing program, resulting in 
Dominick’s submitting false claims for Medicaid reimbursement.151 
Notably, however, the complaint did not allege Safeway’s direct 
participation in the billings.152 In addressing a venue issue Safeway 
raised, the court determined that the complaint “[did] not allege that 
Safeway committed any act proscribed [in] the False Claims  
Act,” despite allegations that Safeway directed its subsidiary to  
commit fraud.153  
2. Direct Involvement in Fraud 
Contrasted with the strict direct involvement approach of 
Schaengold and Safeway is the broader approach suggested in United 
States ex rel. Lisitza v. Par Pharmaceutical Cos., Inc.154 Lisitza involved 
three drug companies owned in whole or in part by Merck KGaA.155 
Alphapharm and Genpharm, generic drug manufacturers, developed a 
generic equivalent to Prozac in anticipation of Prozac’s expiring 
patent.156 The two manufacturers approached a third company, Par 
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Pharmaceutical, to market the generic drug.157 Genpharm became Par’s 
“de facto ‘owner’ ” by installing Genpharm executives in various roles 
at Par, including roles on the Board of Directors and the Office of the 
President.158 Under Genpharm and Alphapharm’s “direction and under 
their control,” Par employed a marketing campaign that promoted  
an illegal drug-switching scheme and illegal financial incentives  
for pharmacies.159 
The court granted Genpharm and Alphapharm’s motion to 
dismiss due to the complaint’s failure to suggest that the entities caused 
the submission of false claims—the same result reached in Schaengold 
and Safeway.160 The specific behavior that the court found lacking, 
however, was different from the behavior required by the strict direct 
involvement approach. Rather than specifying there were no 
allegations that the drug manufacturers directly submitted claims to 
the government, the court instead highlighted the absence of 
allegations of direct involvement in the fraud itself. The court gave 
several examples of allegations that might have saved the pleading: 
“[T]hat any individual employed by Genpharm did anything 
to . . . bring about the sale or marketing . . . through fraud”[;]161 that 
Genpharm “actually ‘directed’ Par to make false statements about the 
[generic drug], or to pay pharmacies to swap drug forms”[;]162 that 
anyone “encouraged Par to market the tablets based on improper 
prescription-switching.”163 Nothing that the court found lacking  
alluded to direct involvement in claims submission but rather in 
directing the fraud.164  
Lisitza relied in part on a case from the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals: United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc.165 Unlike the 
three previously mentioned cases, Schmidt did not involve anything 
resembling a parent-subsidiary relationship but rather two unrelated 
parties to a contract involving illegal kickbacks and referrals.166 Only 
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one of the parties—Mercy Health Systems—submitted the false 
claims.167 The lower district court applied the strict direct involvement 
standard and dismissed the claims against the nonsubmitting party—
Zimmer, Inc.—because it never submitted a cost report and therefore 
could not have caused the other party to submit.168 The Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that Zimmer’s creation and pursuit of the kickback 
and referral schemes provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude 
that Zimmer “knowingly caused Mercy’s false claims to be filed,” despite 
not being directly involved in submitting the claims.169  
III. SOLUTION  
Multiple studies and anecdotal case illustrations have begun 
documenting the ongoing concerns about the adverse effects of private 
equity’s presence in the healthcare industry—increased regulatory 
violations, a decline in patient care, higher prices, and less meaningful 
choice. And though the available evidence of the long-term impact of PE 
in healthcare is scant, it demonstrates a need for effective enforcement 
against potential fraud that could have adverse health consequences for 
patients nationwide.  
The best way to monitor private equity abuses within healthcare 
is to follow the lead of Medrano and Martino-Fleming and permit the 
DOJ to bring False Claims Act charges against PE firms for the 
fraudulent conduct of their portfolio companies when the private equity 
firm played an active role in the fraud. This is a practical method of 
enforcement that could build on existing case law. But this approach 
can function as an effective deterrent only if a PE firm can be held liable 
for its participation in its portfolio company’s fraud without  
further requiring it participated in submitting the actual 
reimbursement claims.  
Acknowledging that expanding FCA enforcement as done under 
Medrano would be the most prudent and practical approach also 
demands an answer as to how exactly the FCA should be applied to  
PE firms in this context and whether that application holds up to  
judicial scrutiny.  
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A. Extended Enforcement Under the False Claims Act 
Medrano sparked speculation that a new DOJ enforcement 
trend lurks around the corner.170 The DOJ’s case against RLH and PCA 
ended in a landmark $20 million settlement, marking the first time a 
PE firm accepted liability under the FCA for the alleged fraud of its 
portfolio company.171 The message of the Medrano settlement, and 
certainly the message delivered by AAG Davis, has put PE firms “on 
notice that their liability may not be limited to just their financial 
exposure in the portfolio company. A private equity firm may itself face 
direct liability.”172  
Section I.B above discusses in detail the mechanics of the FCA 
and touches on the penalties that attach for violations. Expanding 
enforcement of the FCA to PE firms does come after PE firms where it 
hurts the most: their bottom line. The looming threat of the massive 
FCA imposed treble damages could bleed dry a PE’s investment in the 
portfolio. This threat translates to lower returns for investors—a death 
knell for PE firms. Fewer FCA violations translate directly to increased 
quality of care, as healthcare companies operate in compliance with 
regulatory guidelines and avoid behaviors that may jeopardize patient 
health. Given the novelty of this approach as applied to PE firms, 
however, there is still a question of how PE firms actually can be held 
liable for FCA violations of portfolio companies. 
B. Adopting a Direct Involvement in Fraud Causation Standard 
To effectively disincentivize PE firms from encouraging their 
portfolio companies to engage in fraudulent, money-grabbing schemes 
while the firms themselves hide behind the direct involvement theory 
of claim submission, courts should interpret a PE firm’s direct 
involvement in the fraud as sufficient causation in submitting 
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fraudulent claims. This interpretation is supported by legislative 
history, Supreme Court precedent, and policy.  
1. Legislative History  
The legislative history of the 1986 FCA amendments provides 
strong justification for extending the parent-subsidiary doctrines to the 
PE-portfolio relationship and for the “indirect involvement” theory. 
Congress “designated complex corporate structures as a principal 
threat to the integrity of federal procurement programs” and “intended 
duties imposed by the law to strengthen as the size and sophistication 
of the party submitting claims increased.”173 Indeed, there are few 
corporate structures more sophisticated or complex than PE firms. One 
chief evil to be remedied by the amendments was corporate 
compartmentalization: corporate officers maintaining just enough 
distance from the fraud committed by lower-level employees to prevent 
the FCA elements from being satisfied.174 In what has become a favorite 
passage for courts to cite, the Senate Committee Report accompanying 
the 1986 amendments takes aim at “[t]his ‘ostrich-like’ conduct which 
can occur in large corporations [which] poses insurmountable 
difficulties for civil false claims recoveries.”175  
Congress might not have anticipated the role PE would play in 
healthcare when the amendments were passed in 1986, but this 
reasoning lends itself to bringing PE firms under the umbrella of FCA 
defendants when they are directly involved in the fraud. Far from the 
“ostrich-like conduct” targeted in the Senate Committee Report, PE 
firms have actively participated in their portfolio’s fraud under a 
presumption of immunity to these suits by virtue of the relationship’s 
structure—they might have risked losing an investment but were not 
exposing themselves to any liability—so it is not difficult to see how an 
aggressive and reckless takeover approach festered.176  
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2. Supreme Court Precedent  
Adopting an indirect involvement causation interpretation also 
aligns more closely with Supreme Court precedent, at least in third-
party liability cases. Admittedly, these are not parent-subsidiary cases, 
but there can be no justification for exempting a parent company from 
liability for conduct that would render an unrelated third party liable. 
To the extent that a parent company is even better situated to direct a 
subsidiary into a fraudulent scheme by virtue of board seats, common 
management, and general influence, all the more justification exists for 
following the precedent established in the third-party liability cases.  
The Supreme Court cases that touch on third-party liability 
focus on involvement in the fraud, not involvement in the actual billing. 
For example, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,177 like Schmidt, does 
not involve a parent-subsidiary relationship but rather relationships 
between two parties to a contract. The facts of Marcus involved 
electrical contractors who were contracted through local municipalities 
and thus never submitted claims to the federal government.178 In 
holding an FCA claim could be brought against the electrical 
contractors, the Court stated that the FCA’s purpose was “to reach any 
person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims 
which were grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person 
had direct contractual relations with the government.”179   
Based on the Supreme Court’s logic in Marcus, FCA should 
reach a PE firm that assisted in causing its portfolio company to pay 
fraudulent claims, regardless of whether the PE firm had a direct 
contractual relationship with CMS for reimbursements.  
3. Practical Application  
The aforementioned PE cases—Medrano and Martino-
Fleming—can be used to illustrate how this interpretation will work in 
practice. Medrano ended in a settlement and Martino-Fleming is still 
ongoing in April 2021, though each produced district court opinions 
helpful to this analysis.  
The district court in Medrano did not consider the question of 
causation,180 though the magistrate judge found causation satisfied in 
her report based on PE conduct that could have only satisfied a direct 
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involvement in fraud causation theory: approving a fraudulent scheme 
and funding commissions to further the fraudulent scheme.181 There 
were no allegations that the PE firm actually partook in submitting the 
reimbursement claims.182 The PE firm’s decision to settle with the DOJ, 
the first settlement of its kind,183 suggests that the PE firm found this 
meritorious. The general allegations in Medrano are similar to those in 
Schaengold: the parent company helped to operate a system of 
fraudulent compensation that led to its subsidiary submitting false 
claims.184 Under Schaengold, the claims against the PE firm would be 
dismissed. This is not an optimal result, nor is it supported by Supreme 
Court precedent or legislative history.  
Martino-Fleming gives a similar result, though there the district 
court actually ruled on a motion to dismiss that the PE firm had 
sufficient involvement in causing the submission of false claims based 
on its rejection of recommendations to bring its staff into regulatory 
compliance, thus ratifying the policy of submitting false claims.185 
Again, under Schaengold or Safeway, the facts of Martino-Fleming 
would have warranted dismissal. It is important to extend FCA to PE 
firms because of the risk that they represent. Providing effective 
deterrence would require both enhanced due diligence on the front end 
to ensure the portfolio company is not already engaged in fraud and 
increased due diligence on the back end as the PE firm strategizes with 
its portfolio company.  
CONCLUSION 
Since the Medrano charges were announced and the settlement 
was reached, headlines warning private equity firms to tread carefully 
in how they mine for profits in the healthcare industry have splashed 
across the internet.186 Medrano and Martino-Fleming are at once 
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simultaneously unprecedented and precedented: unprecedented in 
their extension of FCA liability to PE firms yet precedented in holding 
a controlling entity accountable for its involvement in the fraudulent 
conduct of its subsidiary. Drawing from existing FCA cases, a court may 
require a PE firm be directly involved in claims or directly involved in 
fraud. To hold such a controlling entity accountable effectively demands 
an interpretation of the FCA that imposes liability in a way that 
recognizes the practical realities and supplants the direct involvement 
in claim submission requirement with a “direct involvement in a 
fraudulent scheme that leads to claim submission” requirement.   
Time will tell whether the next case of PE liability will be upheld 
in court, but if the purpose of the FCA is to be effectuated, the existing 
legal framework can justifiably be extended to the PE firms that are so 
entrenched in the operations of their portfolio companies as to be 
directly involved in knowingly causing the submission of false claims. 
By allowing the Department of Justice to bring FCA charges against 
private equity firms operating in healthcare, the most serious abuses—
those violations of regulations that work to ensure that patients receive 
medical care informed by medical necessity rather than potential 
profit—can be curtailed. 
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